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Abstract
In this paper we present a modification of Reed-Solomon codes that beats the Guruwami-
Sudan 1−√R decoding radius of Reed-Solomon codes at low rates R. The idea is to choose
Reed-Solomon codes U and V with appropriate rates in a (U | U + V ) construction and to
decode them with the Koetter-Vardy soft information decoder. We suggest to use a slightly
more general version of these codes (but which has the same decoding performances as the
(U | U + V )-construction) for code-based cryptography, namely to build a McEliece scheme.
The point is here that these codes not only perform nearly as well (or even better in the low
rate regime) as Reed-Solomon codes, their structure seems to avoid the Sidelnikov-Shestakov
attack which broke a previous McEliece proposal based on generalized Reed-Solomon codes.
1 Introduction
Improving upon the error correction performance of RS codes. Reed-Solomon(RS)
codes are among the most extensively used error correcting codes. It has long been known how
to decode them up to half the minimum distance. This gives a decoding algorithm that corrects
a fraction 1−R2 of errors in an RS code of rate R. However, it is only in the late nineties that
a breakthrough was obtained in this setting with Sudan’s algorithm [19] and its improvement
in [10] who showed how to go beyond this barrier with an algorithm which in its [10] version
decodes any fraction of errors smaller than 1−√R. Later on, it was shown that this decoding
algorithm could also be modified a little bit in order to cope with soft information on the errors
[11]. Then it was realized in [16] that by a slight modification of RS codes and by an increase
of the alphabet size it was possible to beat the 1 − √R decoding radius. Their new family
of codes is list decodable beyond this radius for low rate. Then, [9] improved on these codes
by presenting a new family of codes, namely folded RS codes with a polynomial time decoding
algorithm achieving the list decoding capacity 1−R−  for every rate R and  > 0.
The first purpose of this paper is to present another modification of RS codes that improves
the fraction of errors that can be corrected. It consists in using RS codes in a (U | U + V )
construction. We will show that, in the low rate regime, this class of codes outperforms rather
significantly a classical RS code decoded with the Guruswami and Sudan algorithm [10]. The
point is that this (U | U + V ) code can be decoded in two steps :
1. First by subtracting the left part y1 to the right part y2 of the received vector (y1 | y2)
and decoding it with respect to V . In such a case, we are left with decoding a RS code
with about twice as many errors.
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2. Secondly, once we have recovered the right part v of the codeword, we can get a word
(y1 | y2 − v) which should match two copies of a same word u of U . We can model this
decoding problem by having some soft information.
It turns that the last channel error model is much less noisy than the original q-ary symmetric
channel we started with. This soft information can be used in Koetter and Vardy’s decoding
algorithm. By this means we can choose U to be a RS code of much bigger rate than V . All
in all, it turns out that by choosing U and V with appropriate rates we can beat the 1 − √R
bound in the low-rate regime.
It should be noted however that beating this 1 − √R bound comes at the cost of having
now an algorithm which does not work as for the aforementioned papers [19, 10, 16, 9] for every
error of a given weight (the so called adversarial error model) but with probability 1− o(1) for
errors of a given weight. However, contrarily to [16, 9] which results in a significant increase
of the alphabet size of the code, our alphabet size actually decreases when compared to a RS
code: it can be half of the code length and can be even smaller when we apply this construction
recursively. Indeed, we will show that we can even improve the error correction performances
by applying this construction again to the U and V components, i.e we can choose U to be a
(U1|U1 + V1) code and we replace in the same way the RS code V by a (U2|U2 + V2) where
U1, U2, V1, V2 are RS codes.
Application to cryptography. In a second part of the paper we show how to use such codes
(or codes derived by this approach) for cryptographic purposes, i.e. in a McEliece cryptosystem
[12]. Recall that this public-key cryptosystem becomes more and more fashionable due to the
threats on the most popular public key cryptosystems used todays, namely RSA or DASA and
ECDSA that would be completely broken by Shor’s algorithm [17] if a large scale quantum
computer could be built. Indeed, it is unlikely that a quantum computer would be able to
threaten the security of the McEliece scheme because it is based on an NP-complete problem,
namely decoding a linear code.
Probably one of the main drawback of McEliece when compared to RSA, DSA or ECDSA
is its rather large key size. There have been several attempts to decrease the key size either by
moving to more structured codes or to codes which have better error correction radius [14, 2].
Many of the structured algebraic proposals have been broken (see for instance [8]) but some of
the quasi-cyclic code families that rely on modified LDPC codes or MDPC codes [1, 13] seem to
resist cryptanalysis up to now. Relying on codes with better decoding performance met a similar
fate, since here again many proposals of this kind have been broken. For instance [14] suggests
to replace the binary Goppa codes of the original McEliece cryptosystem by Generalized RS
codes (GRS) because of their much better decoding performance, but it got broken in [18].
There have been several attempts to repair GRS codes in this context either by adding
random columns to the generator matrix of a GRS code [21] or by multiplying this generator
matrix by the inverse of a sparse matrix with small average row weight m [2]. The [21] attempt
got broken in [6] and the parameters of [2] got broken in [7] because m was chosen to be too
small. The problem with the [2] approach is that the attack of [7] fails when m = 2, but the
solution is then no more competitive when compared to a Goppa code because the decoding
radius gets also scaled down by a multiplicative factor of m when compared to a GRS code.
We suggest here to revive the [2] approach with a generalized (U | U + V ) scheme based on
RS codes that has basically the same decoding capacitiy as a RS code and that looks in many
respects like the [2] scheme with m = 2, This approach is also related to the approach pioneered
by Wang in [20]. His code can be viewed as a certain subcode of our (U | U + V ) construction.
However, the decrease of the code rate results in a significant deterioration of the key size when
compared to a code with the same error correction capacity as an RS code.
Notation 1. Throughout the paper we will use the following notation.
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• A linear code of length n, dimension k and distance d over a finite field Fq is refered to as
an [n, k, d]q-code. We denote its dual by C⊥ which is defined to be an [n, n− k, d⊥]q code.
• The Hamming weight of a vector x, denoted by wH(x), is defined as the number of nonzero
elements.
• For a vector x we denote by x(i) the i-th coordinate of x.
2 (U | U + V ) construction
In this section, we recall a few facts about the (U |U + V ) construction and their decoding.
Definition 1. Let U be an [n, ku, du]q code and V be an [n, kv, dv]q code. We define the
(U | U + V )-construction of U and V as the linear code:
C = {(u | u + v) | u ∈ U and v ∈ V } .
The code C has parameters [2n, ku + kv,min {2du, dv}]q. A generator matrix of C is:(
Gu Gu
0 Gv
)
∈ F(ku+kv)×2nq
where Gu and Gv are generator matrices of U and V respectively.
2.1 Soft-decision decoding of (U | U + V ) codes
Let U and V be two codes with parameters [n, ku, du]q and [n, kv, dv]q, respectively and C def=
(U | U + V ). Suppose we transmit the codeword (u | u + v) ∈ C over a noisy channel and we
receive the vector: y = (y1 | y2) = (u | u + v) + (e1 | e2).
Decoding proceeds in two steps:
1. We combine y1 and y2 to find v. That is, we decode y1 − y2 = v + e2 − e1 with respect
to V . In the case of a soft decoder for V we compute first the probability
prob(v(i) = α|y1(i), y2(i)) for all α ∈ Fq.
2. We subtract (0 | v) to (y1 | y2) to get (u + e1 | u + e2) = (z1 | z2). This is a noisy
version of (u | u). We compute now for all α ∈ Fq and all coordinates i the probabilities
prob(u(i) = α|z1(i), z2(i)) which is then passed to a soft decoder for U .
Let us explain how these probabilities can be computed. We assume that the noise model
is given by a discrete memoryless channel with input alphabet Fq and output alphabet Y. The
received vector is denoted by y = (y(1), . . . , y(n)) ∈ Yn and the channel model specifies the
transition probabilities with the following matrix Πy
Πiy(α) = prob(α | y(i)) for i = 1, . . . , n and α ∈ Fq.
Πiy denotes here the i-th column of Πy and Πiy(α) refers to the entry in the i-th column and
row indexed by α ∈ Fq.
We will refer to Π as the q × n reliability matrix of the codewords symbols. We will
see below that this reliability matrix can also be obtained through the (U | U + V ) decoding
process. We will particularly be interested here in the q-ary symmetric channel model.
This channel is parametrized by the crossover probability p and the channel will be denoted
here by q-SCp. Here each time an element from Fq is transmitted and is received either the
3
unchanged input symbol, with probability 1 − p, or any of the other q − 1 symbols, with
probability pq−1 . In other words, the reliability matrix Πy for q-SCp is defined as follows:
Πiy(α) = prob (α | y(i)) =
{
1− p if α = y(i)
p
q−1 if α 6= y(i)
Thus, all columns of Πy are identical up to permutation:
Πiy =

1− p
p
q−1
...
p
q−1
 (up to permutation)
with i = 1, . . . , n.
Let us recall now how the reliability matrices for the decoder of U and V are computed from
the initial reliability matrix.
Reliability matrix for the V -decoder We call in what follows the error model for the
V -decoder the sum model and denote the associated reliability matrix by Π ⊕ Π when Π is
the initial reliability matrix. Recall that before decoding, for each symbol X of V that we want
to decode we subtract two symbols X1 and X2 of the (U | U + V ) code:
X = X2 −X1.
For each of these symbols we have a reliability information prob(X1 = α | Y1) and prob(X2 = β |
Y2) where Y1 and Y2 are random variables that are initially the received symbols corresponding
to X1 and X2 after transmission on the noisy channel but that become sets of received symbols
when we iterate the (U | U + V ) construction as will be seen. When X1 and X2 are uniformly
distributed it can be verified that
prob(X = α|Y1, Y2) =
∑
β∈Fq
prob(X1 = β|Y1) · prob(Y2 = α+ β|Y2)
This leads to the following definition.
(Π⊕Π)iy(α) def=
∑
β∈Fq
Πiy1(β) ·Πiy2(α+ β)
where y1 and y2 are the realizations of the channel transmission of u and u + v respectively.
We also denote by Πiy1 ⊕Πiy2 , where each element represents a column vector, the i-th column
of the Π⊕Π matrix.
Reliability matrix for the U-decoder The computation of prob(u(i) = α|z1(i), z2(i)) can
be performed by computing the probability that a uniformly distributed random variable over
Fq is equal to α given two received symbols y1 and y2 for X sent over two memoryless channels
(and which are chosen uniformly at random in Fq). This probability is readily seen to be equal
to
prob(X = α | y1 and y2) = prob(X = α | y1) · prob(X = α | y2)∑
β∈Fq prob(X = β | y1) · prob(X = β | y2)
We denote by Π×Π the reliability matrix (the input) to a soft-decision decoding algorithm
for the code U . Thus, each element of the reliability matrix Π×Π related to the aforementioned
quantities y and v is defined by:
(Π×Π)iy,v(α) =
Πiy1(α) ·Πiy2(α+ v(i))∑
β∈Fq Πiy1(β) ·Πiy2(β + v(i))
.
To simplify notation we will generally avoid the dependency on v and simply write (Π×Π)y .
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2.2 Algebraic-soft decision decoding of RS codes
Let us recall how the Koetter-Vardy soft decoder [11] can be analyzed. By [11, Theorem 12]
their decoding algorithm outputs a list that contains the codeword c ∈ C if
〈Π, bcc〉√〈Π,Π〉 ≥ √k − 1 + o(1)
as the codelength n tends to infinity, where bcc represents a q × n matrix with entries ci,α = 1
if ci = α, and 0 otherwise; and 〈A,B〉. denotes the inner product of the two q × n matrices A
and B, i.e.
〈A,B〉 def=
q∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ai,jbi,j .
The algorithm uses a parameter s (the total number of interpolation points counted with multi-
plicity). The Little-O o(1) depends on the choice of this parameter and the parameters n and q.
It can be chosen as a function of q in such a way that, when 〈Π,Π〉 has a lower bound given by
some positive constant then, the Little-O of this formula is bounded from above by a function
of q that goes to 0 as q goes to infinity. We will consider here only discrete symmetric channel
models that are defined below. Let us first introduce some notation.
Notation 2 (Probability error vector of a Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC)). For a given
DMC with q-ary inputs we denote by pi the probability vector pi = (prob(x = α|y))α∈Fq where x
is the symbol that has been sent through the channel and y is the received symbol. For a vector
x = (x(β))β∈Fq we denote by x+α the vector x+α = (x(β + α))β∈Fq .
By viewing pi as a random variable (namely as a function of the random variable y), we
define as in [3] a symmetric channel by
Definition 2 (discrete symmetric channel with q-ary inputs). A DMC with q-ary inputs is said
to be symmetric if and only if for any α in Fq we have
p(α)prob(pi = p) = p(0)prob(pi = p+α). (1)
Note that this implies that in a discrete symmetric channel, for any possible realization p
of the probability vector pi (i.e. when prob(pi = p) 6= 0) we necessarily have p(0) 6= 0, since
otherwise we would have p(α) = 0 for all α 6= 0, a contradiction with the fact that p is a
probability vector ∑α∈Fq p(α) = 1. It is proved in [3] that symmetric channels are closed under
the ⊕ and × operations on channels defined in Subsection 2.1. We give now the asymptotic
behavior for a symmetric channel of the Koetter-Vardy decoder, but before doing this we will
need a few lemmas.
Lemma 3. Let pi = (pi(α))α∈Fq be the probability vector associated to a discrete symmetric
channel with q-ary inputs. Then
E(pi(0)) = E
(
||pi||2
)
, with ||pi||2 def=
∑
α∈Fq
pi(α)2.
Proof. Let us begin by observing that for a symmetric channel if p is a possible realization of
the probability vector pi, then p+α is also a possible realization of this probability vector as soon
as p(α) 6= 0. This motivates to introduce the equivalence relation between probability vectors
over Fq :
p ≡ q iff there exists α ∈ Fq for which p+α = q.
We consider for our DMC the set of all equivalence classes of the probability vector pi and
denote by R a set of representatives of such equivalence classes. For a representative r of an
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equivalence class we denote by c(r) the class to which it belongs. Observe now that for such a
representative r = (r(β))β∈Fq we have
prob
(
pi = r+α|pi ∈ c(r)
)
=
∑
α∈Fq
Kr(α)
r(0) (2)
for some constant K > 0 by using (1). Since∑
α∈Fq
prob
(
pi = r+α|pi ∈ c(r)
)
= 1 and
∑
α∈Fq
r(α) = 1
we necessarily have K = r(0). Therefore,
∑
α∈Fq
r+α(0)prob
(
pi = r+α|pi ∈ c(r)
)
=
∑
α∈Fq
r(α)Kr(α)
r(0) =
∑
α∈Fq
r(α)2.
This implies that
E(pi(0)) =
∑
r∈R
prob(pi ∈ c(r))
∑
α∈Fq
r+α(0)prob
(
pi = r+α|pi ∈ c(r)
)
=
∑
r∈R
prob(pi ∈ c(r))
∑
α∈Fq
r(α)2
=
∑
r∈R
prob(pi ∈ c(r)) ||r||2 = E
(
||pi||2
)
.
Let us recall the Chebyshev inequality which says that for any random variable X we have
prob(|X − E(X)| ≥ t) ≤ Var(X)
t2
(3)
We are going to use this result with X = 〈Π, b0c〉 and X = 〈Π,Π〉. This leads to the following
concentration results.
Lemma 4. Let  > 0. We have
prob
(
〈Π, b0c〉 ≤ (1− )nE(||pi||2)
)
≤ 1
n2
(
E(||pi||2
)2 (4)
prob
(
〈Π,Π〉 ≥ (1 + )nE(||pi||2)
)
≤ 1
n2
(
E(||pi||2
)2 (5)
Proof. Let us first prove (4). First observe that
〈Π, b0c〉 =
n∑
i=1
Πi(0)
By linearity of expectation and Lemma 3 we have
E {〈Π, b0c〉} = nE(pi(0)) = nE
(
||pi||2
)
. (6)
Since the column vectors Π1(0),Π2(0), . . . ,Πn(0) are independent random variables we also
obtain
Var {〈Π, b0c〉} = Var
(
n∑
i=1
Πi(0)
)
= nVar (pi(0)) ≤ n. (7)
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From this we deduce
prob
(
〈Π, b0c〉 ≤ (1− )nE(||pi||2)
)
≤ prob
(∣∣∣〈Π, b0c〉 − nE(||pi||2)∣∣∣ ≥ nE(||pi||2))
≤ Var {〈Π, b0c〉}
2n2
(
E(||pi||2)
)2 by (3) and (6)
≤ 1
2n
(
E(||pi||2)
)2 by (7)
This proves (4). The second statement follows by similar considerations. We have in this case
E {〈Π,Π〉} = nE
(
||(||pi)2
)
(8)
Var {〈Π,Π〉} ≤ n (9)
This can be used to prove that
prob
(
〈Π,Π〉 ≥ (1 + )nE(||pi||2)
)
≤ prob
(∣∣∣〈Π,Π〉 − nE(||pi||2)∣∣∣ ≥ nE(||pi||2))
≤ Var {〈Π,Π〉}
2n2
(
E(||pi||2)
)2 by (3) and (8)
≤ 1
2n
(
E(||pi||2)
)2 by (9)
We are ready now to prove the following theorem which gives a (tight) lower bound on the
error-correction capacity of the Koetter-Vardy decoding algorithm over a discrete memoryless
channel.
Theorem 5. Let (Cn)n≥1 be an infinite family of Reed-Solomon codes of rate ≤ R. Denote by
qn the alphabet size of Cn that is assumed to be a non decreasing sequence that goes to infinity
with n. Consider an infinite family of qn-ary symmetric channels with associated probability
error vectors pin such that E
(
||pin||2
)
has a limit as n tends to infinity. Let
CKV
def= lim
n→∞E
(
||pin||2
)
.
This infinite family of codes can be decoded correctly by the Koetter-Vardy decoding algorithm
with probability 1− o(1) as n tends to infinity as soon as there exists  > 0 such that
R ≤ CKV − .
Remark 1. Let us observe that for the q-SCp we have
E
(
||pi||2
)
= (1− p)2 + (q − 1) p
2
(q − 1)2 = (1− p)
2 +O
(1
q
)
.
By letting q going to infinity, we recover in this way the performance of the Guruswami-Sudan
algorithm which works as soon as R < (1− p)2.
Proof of Theorem 5. Without loss of generality we may assume that the codeword that was
sent is the zero codeword 0. Let n0 be such that
CKV − 2 ≤ E
(
||pin||2
)
≤ CKV + 2 (10)
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for any n ≥ n0. For n ≥ n0 we can write that the rate Rn of Cn satisfies
Rn ≤ CKV − 
≤ E
(
||pin||2
)
− /2 (11)
Let K and N be the dimension and the length of Cn. In such a case we have√
K − 1
N
≤
√
K
N
≤
√
E
(
||pin||2
)
− /2 (by (11))
≤
√
E
(
||pin||2
)√√√√1− 
2E
(
||pin||2
)
≤
√
E
(
||pin||2
)1− 
4E
(
||pin||2
)
 (since √1− x ≤ 1− x2 .)
≤
√
E
(
||pin||2
)(
1− 4CKV + 2
)
(by (10)) (12)
Let δ be a positive constant that we are going to choose afterwards. Note that if an event E1
has probability ≥ 1− 1 and another event E2 has probability ≥ 1− 2, then
prob(E1 ∩ E2) = prob(E1) + prob(E2)− prob(E1 ∪ E2) ≥ 1− 1 + 1− 2 − 1 = 1− 1 − 2.
We can use this remark together with Lemma 4 to deduce that with probability greater than
or equal to 1− 2
Nδ2(E(||pin||2)2 we have at the same time
〈Πn, b0c〉 ≥ (1− δ)NE(||pin||2) (13)
〈Πn,Πn〉 ≤ (1 + δ)NE(||pin||2) (14)
In such a case we have 〈Πn, b0c〉√〈Πn,Πn〉 ≥ 1− δ√1 + δ
√
N
√
E(||pin||2) (15)
There exists x0 > 0 such that for every x ∈ [0, x0] we have
1− x√
1 + x
≤ 1− 2x.
Therefore for δ ≤ x0 we have in the aforementioned case
〈Πn, b0c〉√〈Πn,Πn〉 ≥ (1− 2δ)
√
N
√
E(||pin||2) (16)
Let us choose now δ such that
δ = min
(
x0,
′
4
)
.
where ′ def= 4CKV+2 . This choice implies
〈Πn, b0c〉√〈Πn,Πn〉 ≥ (1− ′/2)
√
N
√
E(||pin||2)
≥ 1− 
′/2
1− ′
√
K − 1
N
(17)
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where we used (12) for the last inequality. Therefore we deduce that in the aforementioned case
(i.e. when (13) and (14) both hold), that we can choose s appropriately in the Koetter-Vardy
algorithm so that the codeword 0 is in the list output by the algorithm. The probability that
(17) is satisfied is greater than or equal to 1− 2
Nδ2(E(||pin||2)2 which is also greater than or equal
to (by using (10)) 1− 2
Nδ2(CKV− 2)
2 which goes to 1 as N goes to infinity.
3 Correcting errors beyond the Guruswami-Sudan bound
3.1 The (U | U + V )-construction
Now suppose we choose U and V as RS codes in a (U | U + V ) construction. We start with
a q-ary symmetric channel with error probability p. Recall that the reliability matrix for the
U -decoder is Π1 = Π×Π whereas for the V -decoder it is Π2 = Π⊕Π.
Lemma 6. Let piU and piV be the probability vectors corresponding to decoding the codes U and
V respectively.
• The channel error model of the code V is a q-SCp′ with p′ = 2p− p2 and
E
(
||piV ||2
)
= (1− p)4 +O
(1
q
)
.
• For the channel error model of the code U we have
E
(
||piU ||2
)
= (p+ 2)(p− 1)
2
2− p +O
(1
q
)
.
Proof. The proof of this Lemma can be found in Appendix A
Proposition 7. As q tends to infinity, the (U | U + V )-construction can be decoded correctly
by the Koetter-Vardy decoding algorithm with probability 1− o(1) if
R <
(p3 − 4p2 + 4p− 4)(1− p)2
2(p− 2)
Proof. The (U | U + V )-construction can be decoded correctly by the Koetter-Vardy decoding
algorithm if it decodes correctly U and V . By Theorem 5 decoding succeeds with probability
1− o(1) when we choose the rate RU of U to be any positive number below E
(
||piU ||2
)
and the
rate of V any positive number below E
(
||piV ||2
)
. Since the rate R of the (U | U + V ) construction
is equal to RU+RV2 decoding succeeds if
R < lim
q→∞
E
{
||piU ||2
}
+ E
{
||piV ||2
}
2 =
(p3 − 4p2 + 4p− 4)(1− p)2
2(p− 2) .
From Figure 2 we deduce that the (U | U + V ) decoder outperforms the RS decoder with
Guruswami-Sudan as soon as R < 0.168.
9
3.2 Recursive application of the (U | U + V ) construction
Now we will study what happens over the q-SCp if we apply recursively the (U | U + V ) con-
struction. So we start with a (U | U + V ) code, we choose U to be a (U1 | U1 + V1) code and V
to be a (U2 | U2 + V2) code, where U1, U2, V1 and V2 are RS codes over the same alphabet Fq
and of the same length. In other words, we look for a code of the form
(U1 | U1 + V1 | U1 + U2 | U1 + U2 + V1 + V2) =
{(u1|u1 + v1|u1 + u2|u1 + u2 + v1 + v2) : ui ∈ Ui,vi ∈ Vi}
From Lemma 6 we obtain the channel error models for decoding U1, V1, U2 and V2 respectively,
their reliability matrices are given by Π1×Π1, Π1⊕Π1, Π2×Π2 and Π2⊕Π2 respectively (see
Fig. 3). We let p′ def= 2p− p2.
Π
Π1 = Π×Π
Π1 ×Π1 Π1 ⊕Π1
Π2 = Π⊕Π
Π2 ×Π2 Π2 ⊕Π2
Fig. 1: The channel error models for (U1 | U1 + V1 | U1 + U2 | U1 + U2 + V1 + V2).
Lemma 8. Let piUi and piVi be the probability vectors corresponding to decoding the codes Ui’s
and Vi’s.
• The channel error model of the code V2 is a q-SCp′′ with p′′ = 2p′ − p′2 and
E
(
||piV2 ||2
)
= (1− p)8 +O
(1
q
)
;
• E
(
||piU2 ||2
)
= (2+p
′)(1−p′)2
(2−p′) +O
(
1
q
)
;
• E
(
||piV1 ||2
)
= (1− p)4
(
2+3p+8p2−4p3
2−p
)
+O
(
1
q
)
;
• E
(
||piU1 ||2
)
= (5p
3−6p2−5p−4)(1−p)2
4−3p +O
(
1
q
)
.
Proof. The proof of this Lemma can be found in Appendix B
Proposition 9. As q tends to infinity, the (U1 | U1 + V1 | U1 + U2 | U1 + U2 + V1 + V2)-construction
can be decoded correctly by the Koetter-Vardy decoding algorithm with probability 1− o(1) if
R <
(3p10 − 34p9 + 187p8 − 628p7 + 1376p6 − 2016p5 + 1970p4 − 1272p3 + 568p2 − 208p+ 64)(p− 1)2
4(p2 − 2p+ 2)(3p− 4)(p− 2)
Proof. Decoding of (U1 | U1 + V1 | U1 + U2 | U1 + U2 + V1 + V2) succeeds if the Koetter-Vardy
decoder is able to decode correctly U1, U2, V1 and V2. This happens with probability 1− o(1)
as soon as the rates RU1 , RU2 , RV1 and RV2 of these codes satisfy for some  > 0
RU1 ≤ E
(
||piU1 ||2
)
− 
RU2 ≤ E
(
||piU2 ||2
)
− 
RV1 ≤ E
(
||piV1 ||2
)
− 
RV1 ≤ E
(
||piV2 ||2
)
− 
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Since the rate R of (U1 | U1 + V1 | U1 + U2 | U1 + U2 + V1 + V2) is given by
R = RU1 +RU2 +RV1 +RV24
we finally obtain that decoding succeeds with probability 1−o(1) as soon as the rate R is chosen
such that
R < lim
q→∞
∑2
i=1 E
{
||piUi ||2
}
+ E
{
||piVi ||2
}
4
This implies the proposition by plugging the value of these expecations by using Lemma 8.
Fig. 2: Rate plotted against the crossover error probability p for several algorithms. The red
line refers to the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm, the blue line to the (U | U + V )-construction
and the dashed line to the (U1 | U1 + V1 | U1 + U2 | U1 + U2 + V1 + V2)-construction.
From Figure 2 we deduce that if we apply twice the (U | U + V )-construction we get better
performance than decoding a classical RS code with the Guruswami-Sudan decoder for low rate
codes, specifically for R < 0.3.
4 A new Mc-Eliece scheme
As we have seen, this (U | U + V ) construction gives codes which in the low rate regime have
even better error correction capacities than a standard RS code. This suggests to use such codes
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in a McEliece cryptosystem to replace the original Goppa codes. These (U | U + V ) codes do not
only have a better error correction capacity, they also allow to avoid the Sidelnikov-Shestakov
attack [18] that broke a previous proposal based on GRS codes [14]. Furthermore we can
even strengthen the security of this scheme by using instead of the (U | U + V ) construction
a generalized (U | U + V ) code which has trivially the same error-correction capacity as the
(U | U + V ) construction but with better minimum distance properties which seems essential to
avoid attacks based on finding minimum weight codewords in the code and trying to unravel the
code structure from those minimum weight codewords. Analyzing precisely attacks of this kind
needs however additional tools due to the peculiar structure of these generalized (U | U + V )
codes (it is for instance inappropriate to use the analysis done for random codes) and is out of
scope of this paper.
Definition 3. Let (U, V ) be a pair of codes with parameters [n, ku, du]q and [n, kv, dv]q, respec-
tively. Consider the following matrix
D =
(
D1 D3
D2 D4
)
∈ Fn×nq
where the Di’s are diagonal matrices such that D is non singular. We define the generalized
(U | U + V )-construction of U and V with respect to D as the matrix product code:
{(uD1 + vD2 | uD3 + vD4) | u ∈ U and v ∈ V } .
It is denoted by [U, V ] ·D.
Remark 2. Let U and V be codes with generator matricesGu andGv, and parity check matrices
Hu and Hv, respectively. It is a simple exercise to show that
G =
(
GuD1 GuD3
GvD2 GvD4
)
and H =
(
HuD1 −HuD3
HvD2 −HvD4
)
is a generator matrix and a parity check matrix, respectively for [U, V ] ·D.
We consider the matrix-product construction [U, V ] ·D which was already introduced in [5]
and rediscovered in [4, 15]. In [4, Theorem3.7] a lower bound for the minimum distance of such
code is given when the matrix D has a certain property, namely non-singular by columns. In
[15] a similar result is proved but makes the hypothesis that U contains V (but D is arbitrary).
Their result does not seem to cover exactly our case, therefore we give a proof below.
Lemma 10. The code [U, V ] ·D has parameters [2n, ku + kv, d] with
min{2du, dv} ≤ d ≤ min{2du, 2dv}.
Proof. It is clear that C has length 2n and dimension ku + kv.
Now, consider a nonzero codeword c = (uD1 + vD2 | uD3 + vD4) ∈ C. We distinguish
two cases:
• If v = 0. Then, wH(c) = 2wH(u) ≥ 2du.
• Otherwise, if v 6= 0. By the Triangle Inequality wH(a+ b) ≥ wH(a)−wH(b) and the fact
that D is non singular we have that
wH(c) = wH(uD1 + vD2) + wH(uD3 + vD4)
≥ wH(uD1 + vD2) + wH(v
(
D4 −D2D−11 D3
)
)− wH((uD1 + vD2)D−11 D3)
= wH(v) ≥ dv
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Thus, d ≥ min{2du, dv}. Moreover, take u ∈ U and v = 0 with wH(u) = du. In such a case
wH((uD1 + vD2 | uD3 + vD4)) = 2du and therefore d ≤ 2du. The other upper bound follows
by choosing V ∈ V and u = 0 with wH(v) = dv.
Note that the minimum distance of this generalized (U | U + V ) construction can supersede
the minimum distance of the standard (U | U + V ) construction which is equal to min{2du, dv}.
Lemma 11. The dual code of [U, V ] ·D is the matrix product code [U⊥, V ⊥] ·D′ with
D′ =
(
D1 −D3
D2 −D4
)
This code has parameters [2n, n− (ku + kv), d⊥] with min{2d⊥u , d⊥v } ≤ d⊥ ≤ min{2d⊥u , 2dv⊥}.
Proof. Remark 2 showed that the dual code of [U, V ]·D is a generalized (U | U + V )-construction
of U⊥ and V ⊥. Then, the result follows from Lemma 10.
These generalized (U | U + V ) codes based on RS constituent codes have clearly an efficient
decoding which is similar to the (U | U + V )-decoder. There are only a few differences: when
we receive a word (y1,y2) we just compute the difference y1D3 − y2D1 which should be a
noisy version of v(D2D3 −D4D1). However the error correction capacity is the same as the
original (U | U + V ) with this kind of decoding algorithm. More precisely, the McEliece scheme
we propose is the following
Key generation:
– Choose U, V as RS codes of some length n.
– Construct a random matrix D as described in Definition 2.
– Let G be a random generator matrix of the code C = [U, V ] ·D ·Σ2n where Σ2n is
a permutation matrix of size 2n and AC a decoding algorithm for C that typically
corrects t errors. It consists in applying Σ−12n to the received word and then performing
the aforementioned generalized (U | U + V )-decoder.
The public key and the private key are given respectively by:
Kpub = (G, t) and Ksecret = AC
Encryption: y = mG + e where m is the message and e is a random error vector of
weight at most t.
Decryption: Use Ksecret to retrieve m.
Thus, by choosing code U and V of large enough minimum distance we avoid attacks that
try to recover the code structure by looking for low weight codewords either in the code or
in its dual. If the minimum distance of the generalized (U | U + V ) code is equal to 2du such
codewords arise as codewords of the form (uD1|uD3)Σ2n. This clearly leaks information about
Σ2n and D1 and D3 if we are able to find such codewords. This is why we want to avoid that
such codewords can be easily found.
Note that Wang proposed in [20] a very similar scheme, with the difference that U was a
random code and V a RS code and that he took only a subcode of the generalized (U | U + V )
code namely the code generated by
(
GuD1 +GvD2 GuD3 +GvD4
)
. The code rate loss
implied by this choice results in a significant loss in the key size (since we have to protect ourself
against generic decoders for t errors for a code which is of much smaller dimension). The fact
that U is random in his scheme however is a rather strong argument in favor of its security.
13
References
[1] M. Baldi, M. Bianchi, and F. Chiaraluce. Security and complexity of the McEliece cryp-
tosystem based on QC-LDPC codes. IET Information Security, 7(3):212–220, Sept. 2013.
[2] M. Baldi, M. Bianchi, F. Chiaraluce, J. Rosenthal, and D. Schipani. Enhanced public key
security for the McEliece cryptosystem. J. Cryptology, 2014.
[3] A. Bennatan and D. Burshtein. Design and analysis of nonbinary LDPC codes over ar-
bitrary discrete-memoryless channels. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 52(2):549–583, Feb.
2006.
[4] T. Blackmore and H. G. Norton. Matrix-product codes over fq. Applicable Algebra in
Engineering, Communication and Computing, 12(6):477–500, 2001.
[5] E. Blokh and H. V. Zyblov. Coding of generalized concatenated codes. Problems of Infor-
mation Transmission, 10:218–222, 1974.
[6] A. Couvreur, P. Gaborit, V. Gauthier-Umaña, A. Otmani, and J.-P. Tillich. Distinguisher-
based attacks on public-key cryptosystems using Reed-Solomon codes. Des. Codes Cryp-
togr., 73(2):641–666, 2014.
[7] A. Couvreur, A. Otmani, J. Tillich, and V. Gauthier-Umaña. A polynomial-time attack
on the BBCRS scheme. In J. Katz, editor, Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2015, volume
9020 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 175–193. Springer, 2015.
[8] J.-C. Faugère, A. Otmani, L. Perret, F. de Portzamparc, and J.-P. Tillich. Folding alternant
and Goppa Codes with non-trivial automorphism groups. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
62(1):184–198, 2016.
[9] V. Guruswami and A. Rudra. Explicit capacity-achieving list-decodable codes. In Proceed-
ings of the Thirty-eighth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’06,
pages 1–10, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[10] V. Guruswami and M. Sudan. Improved decoding of Reed-Solomon and algebraic-geometry
codes. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 45(6):1757–1767, 1999.
[11] R. Koetter and A. Vardy. Algebraic soft-decision decoding of reed-solomon codes. IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, 49(11):2809–2825, 2003.
[12] R. J. McEliece. A Public-Key System Based on Algebraic Coding Theory, pages 114–116.
Jet Propulsion Lab, 1978.
[13] R. Misoczki, J.-P. Tillich, N. Sendrier, and P. S. L. M. Barreto. MDPC-McEliece: New
McEliece variants from moderate density parity-check codes. In Proc. IEEE Int. Symposium
Inf. Theory - ISIT, pages 2069–2073, 2013.
[14] H. Niederreiter. Knapsack-type cryptosystems and algebraic coding theory. Problems of
Control and Information Theory, 15(2):159–166, 1986.
[15] F. Özbudak and H. Stichtenoth. Note on niederreiter-xing’s propagation rule for linear
codes. Applicable Algebra in Engineering, Communication and Computing, 13(1):53–56,
2002.
[16] F. Parvaresh and A. Vardy. Correcting errors beyond the guruswami-sudan radius in
polynomial time. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2005. FOCS 2005. 46th Annual
IEEE Symposium on, pages 285–294, 2005.
14
[17] P. Shor. Algorithms for quantum computation: Discrete logarithms and factoring. In
S. Goldwasser, editor, FOCS, pages 124–134, 1994.
[18] V. M. Sidelnikov and S. Shestakov. On the insecurity of cryptosystems based on generalized
Reed-Solomon codes. Discrete Math. Appl., 1(4):439–444, 1992.
[19] M. Sudan. Decoding of Reed Solomon codes beyond the error-correction bound. J. Com-
plexity, 13(1):180–193, 1997.
[20] Y. Wang. Quantum resistant random linear code based public key encryption scheme
RLCE, Dec. 2015.
[21] C. Wieschebrink. Two NP-complete problems in coding theory with an application in code
based cryptography. In Proc. IEEE Int. Symposium Inf. Theory - ISIT, pages 1733–1737,
2006.
A The (U | U + V ) construction
Along the following two sections and by abuse of notation we will use the symbol O
(
1
q
)
not
only to describes the big O notation but also as a vector whose L-infinity norm is behaved like
the function 1q when q tends to infinity, in other words, a vector whose elements tends to zero
as q goes to infinity . Recall that the infinity norm of a vector v ∈ Fnq , denoted ||v||∞, is defined
as the maximum of the absolute values of its components, i.e.
||v||∞ = max {|v(i) | i = 1, . . . , n|} .
In this appendix, U and V are RS codes and we will use them in a (U | U + V ) construction.
We start with a q-ary symmetric channel with error probability p (q-SCp). On the following we
obtain the channel error models for decoding U and V. Recall that the reliability matrix for the
U -decoder is Π1 = Π×Π whereas for the V -decoder it is Π2 = Π⊕Π.
Suppose we transmit the codeword u over a noisy channel and we receive the vector
y = (y1 | y2) = u + (e1 | e2)
We begin to observe that in the case of a q-ary symmetric channel we have only the following
possibilities
Case 1 No error has occurred in position i: e1(i) = e2(i) = 0.
Case 2 An error has occured in position i: e1(i) 6= 0 or e2(i) 6= 0.
Case 3 Two errors have occurred in position i: e1(i) 6= 0 and e2(i) 6= 0.
Probability of
occurrence
Case 1
(No errors) (1− p)
2
Case 2
(1 error) 2p(1− p)
Case 3
(2 errors) p
2
Table 1: Ways of combining the vectors y1(i) and y2(i)
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A.1 The matrix Π1 = Π× Π in the q-ary symmetric channel
Lemma 12. Let piU be the probability vector corresponding to decoding the code U . For the
channel error model of the code U we have
E
(
||piU ||2
)
= (1− p)2 + 2p(2− p)
(1− p
2− p
)2
+O
(1
q
)
= (p+ 2)(p− 1)
2
2− p +O
(1
q
)
Proof. We will treat each case as a separate study.
Case 1 We have (up to permutation)
Πiy1 ×Πiy2 =

1− p
p
q−1
...
p
q−1
×

1− p
p
q−1
...
p
q−1
 =

(1−p)2
β
p2
(q−1)β
...
p2
(q−1)β
 =

1− s
s
q−1
...
s
q−1
 =

1
0
...
0
+O
(1
q
)
with β = (1− p)2 + (q − 1) p2(q−1)2 . And, s = p
2
(1−p)2(q−1)+p2 = O
(
1
q
)
Case 2 We have (up to permutation)
Πiy1 ×Πiy2 =

1− p
p
q−1
p
q−1
...
p
q−1

×

p
q−1
1− p
p
q−1
...
p
q−1

=

(1−p)p
(q−1)β
(1−p)p
(q−1)β
p2
(q−1)2β
...
p2
(q−1)2β

=

1−p
2−p
1−p
2−p
p
(q−1)(2−p)
...
p
(q−1)(2−p)

+O
(1
q
)
with
β = 2(1− p)p(q − 1) + (q − 2)
p2
(q − 1)2 =
p(2− p)
(q − 1) +O
(1
q
)
Case 3 The probability that the same error occurred at e1(i) and e2(i) is assummed to be
negligible. Hence (up to permutation),
Πiy1 ×Πiy2 =

p
q−1
1− p
p
q−1
p
q−1
...
p
q−1

×

p
q−1
p
q−1
1− p
p
q−1
...
p
q−1

=

1−p
2−p
1−p
2−p
p
(q−1)(2−p)
...
p
(q−1)(2−p)

+O
(1
q
)
Once we know all the columns of matrix Π×Π, the result follows easily.
Hence, the channel error model of the code U is represented by the reliability matrix Π1 =
Π×Π and the expectation of the L2 norm ||pi||2 of a column pi of Π1 is given by
E
(
||piU ||2
)
(1− p)2 + 2p(2− p)
(1− p
2− p
)2
+O
(1
q
)
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A.2 The matrix Π2 = Π⊕ Π in the q-ary symmetric channel
Lemma 13. Let piV be the probability vector corresponding to decoding the code V . The channel
error model of the code V is a q-SCp′ with p′ = 2p− p2 and
E
(
||piV ||2
)
= (1− p′)2 +O
(1
q
)
= (1− p)4 +O
(1
q
)
.
Proof. We will treat each case as a separate study.
Case 1 No error occurred in position i, i.e. Πiy1 = Πiy2 . Hence (up to permutation),
Πiy1 ⊕Πiy2 =

1− p
p
q−1
...
p
q−1
⊕

1− p
p
q−1
...
p
q−1
 =

1− p′
p′
q−1
...
p′
q−1
+O
(1
q
)
with p′ = 2p− p2
Case 2 One error occurred in position i, in other words, the order of the elements of Πiy1 and
Πiy2 are different. Thus (up to permutation),
Πiy1 ⊕Πiy2 =

1− p
p
q−1
p
q−1
...
p
q−1

⊕

p
q−1
1− p
p
q−1
...
p
q−1

=

p′
q−1
1− p′
p′
q−1
...
p′
q−1

+O
(1
q
)
with p′ = 2p− p2
Case 3 We will have two options: either e1(i) = e2(i) (similar to Case 1, up to permutation)
or e1(i) 6= e2(i) (similar to Case 2, up to permutation).
Thus, the transition matrix Π⊕Π can be represented as a q-SCp′ with p′ = 2p− p2.
B Recursive application of the (U | U + V ) construction
In this appendix we study what happens over a q-ary symmetric channel with error probabil-
ity p (q-SCp) if we apply recursively the (U | U + V ) construction. That is, we start with a
(U | U + V ) code, we choose U to be a (U1 | U1 + V1) code and V to be a (U2 | U2 + V2) code,
where U1, U2, V1 and V2 are RS codes over the same alphabet Fq and of the same length. In
other words, we look for a code of the form
(U1 | U1 + V1 | U1 + U2 | U1 + U2 + V1 + V2) =
{(u1 | u1 + v1 | u1 + u2 | u1 + u2 + v1 + v2) : ui ∈ Ui,vi ∈ Vi} .
From Lemma 13 and 12 we will obtain the channel error models for decoding U1, V1, U2 and
V2 respectively, their reliability matrices are given by Π1 ×Π1, Π1 ⊕Π1, Π2 ×Π2 and Π2 ⊕Π2
respectively (see Figure 3). We use the previous notation p′ def= 2p− p2.
Suppose we transmit the codeword
(u1 | u1 + v1 | u1 + u2 | u1 + u2 + v1 + v2)
over a noisy channel and we receive the vector
y = (y1 | y2 | y3 | y4) = (u1 | u1 + v1 | u1 + u2 | u1 + u2 + v1 + v2) + (e1 | e2 | e3 | e4)
We begin to observe that in the q-ary symmetric channel we have only the possibilities given in
Table 2
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ΠΠ1 = Π×Π
Π1 ×Π1 Π1 ⊕Π1
Π2 = Π⊕Π
Π2 ×Π2 Π2 ⊕Π2
Fig. 3: The different channel error models for (U1 | U1 + V1 | U1 + U2 | U1 + U2 + V1 + V2)
Result of the combination of ... Probability ofoccurrence
Case 4
(No errors)
Case 1 and Case 1
ej(i) = 0 for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (1− p)
4
Case 5
(1 error)
Case 1 and Case 2
∃j1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} s.t. ej1(i) 6= 0
And ej(i) = 0, otherwise.
4p(1− p)3
Case 6
(2 errors)
Case 1 and Case 3
∃j1 ∈ {1, 3} s.t. ej1(i), ej1+1(i) 6= 0
And ej(i) = 0, otherwise.
2p2(1− p)2
Case 7
(2 errors)
Case 2 and Case 2
∃j1 ∈ {1, 2} and j2 ∈ {3, 4} s.t. ej1(i), ej2(i) 6= 0
And ej(i) = 0, otherwise.
4p2(1− p)2
Case 8
(3 errors)
Case 2 and Case 3
∃j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} s.t. ej1(i) = 0
And ej(i) 6= 0, otherwise.
4p3(1− p)
Case 9
(4 errors)
Case 3 and Case 3
ej(i) 6= 0 for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} p
4
Table 2: Ways of combining the vectors y1(i), y2(i), y3(i) and y4(i)
B.1 The matrix Π2 ⊕ Π2 in the q-ary symmetric channel
Lemma 14. Let piV2 be the probability vector corresponding to decoding the code V2. The channel
error model of the code V2 is a q-SCp′′ with p′′ = 2p′ − p′2 and
E
(
||piV2 ||2
)
= (1− p”)2 +O
(1
q
)
= (1− p)8 +O
(1
q
)
Proof. Direct consequence of Lemma 13.
B.2 The matrix Π2 × Π2 in the q-ary symmetric channel
Lemma 15. Let piU2 be the probability vector corresponding to decoding the code U2. We have
E
(
||piU2 ||2
)
= (2 + p
′)(1− p′)2
(2− p′) +O
(1
q
)
Proof. Since the transition matrix Π⊕Π can be represented as a q-SCp′ with p′ = 2p− p2, this
case can be treat similar to Lemma 12.
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B.3 The matrix Π1 ⊕ Π1 in the q-ary symmetric channel
Lemma 16. Let piV1 be the probability vector corresponding to decoding the code V1. We have
E
(
||piV1 ||2
)
= (1− p)4
(
2 + 3p+ 8p2 − 4p3
2− p
)
+O
(1
q
)
Proof. We will treat each case as a separate study.
Case 4 We have that the column
(
Πiy1 ×Πiy2
)
⊕
(
Πiy3 ×Πiy4
)
is (up to permutation)


1
0
...
0
+O
(1
q
)⊕


1
0
...
0
+O
(1
q
)+O
(1
q
)
=

1
0
...
0
+O
(1
q
)
Case 5 We have that the column
(
Πiy1 ×Πiy2
)
⊕
(
Πiy3 ×Πiy4
)
is (up to permutation)


1 + 0
0
...
0
+O
(1
q
)⊕


1−p
2−p
1−p
2−p
p
(q−1)(2−p)
...
p
(q−1)(2−p)

+O
(1
q
)

=

1−p
2−p
1−p
2−p
0
...
0

+O
(1
q
)
Case 6 Identical result to the above.
Case 7 We have that the column
(
Πiy1 ×Πiy2
)
⊕
(
Πiy3 ×Πiy4
)
is (up to permutation)


1−p
2−p
1−p
2−p
p
(q−1)(2−p)
p
(q−1)(2−p)
...
p
(q−1)(2−p)

+O
(1
q
)

⊕


1−p
2−p
p
(q−1)(2−p)
1−p
2−p
p
(q−1)(2−p)
...
p
(q−1)(2−p)

+O
(1
q
)

=

(
1−p
2−p
)2(
1−p
2−p
)2(
1−p
2−p
)2(
1−p
2−p
)2
0
...
0

+O
(1
q
)
Case 8 Identical result to the above.
Case 9 Identical result to the above.
Once we know all the columns of matrix Π2 ⊕Π2, the result follows easily.
B.4 The matrix Π1 × Π1 in the q-ary symmetric channel
Lemma 17. Let piU1 be the probability vector corresponding to decoding the code U1. We have
E
(
||piU1 ||2
)
= (5p
3 − 6p2 − 5p− 4)(1− p)2
4− 3p +O
(1
q
)
Proof. We study separately three different cases:
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• Case 4, Case 5 and Case 6. In all these cases the columns of the transition matrix have
the same form (up to permutation).
Πiy1 ×Πiy2 ×Πiy3 ×Πiy4 =

1
0
...
0
+O
(1
q
)
• Case 7 We have that the column Πiy1 ×Πiy2 ×Πiy3 ×Πiy4 is (up to permutation)


1−p
2−p
1−p
2−p
p
(q−1)(2−p)
p
(q−1)(2−p)
...
p
(q−1)(2−p)

+O
(1
q
)

×


1−p
2−p
p
(q−1)(2−p)
1−p
2−p
p
(q−1)(2−p)
...
p
(q−1)(2−p)

+O
(1
q
)

=

(
1−p
2−p
)2 1
α
(1−p)p
(2−p)2(q−1)
1
α
(1−p)p
(2−p)2(q−1)
1
α
p2
(q−1)2(2−p)2
1
α
...
p2
(q−1)2(2−p)2
1
α

+O
(1
q
)
=

1
0
...
0
+O
(1
q
)
with α =
(1− p
2− p
)2
+ 2 (1− p)p(2− p)2(q − 1) + (q − 3)
p2
(q − 1)2(2− p)2 =
(1− p
2− p
)2
+O
(1
q
)
• Case 8 We have that the column Πiy1 ×Πiy2 ×Πiy3 ×Πiy4 is (up to permutation)


1−p
2−p
1−p
2−p
p
(q−1)(2−p)
p
(q−1)(2−p)
p
(q−1)(2−p)
...
p
(q−1)(2−p)

+O
(1
q
)

×


p
(q−1)(2−p)
p
(q−1)(2−p)
1−p
2−p
1−p
2−p
p
(q−1)(2−p)
...
p
(q−1)(2−p)

+O
(1
q
)

=

(1−p)p
(2−p)2(q−1)
1
α
(1−p)p
(2−p)2(q−1)
1
α
(1−p)p
(2−p)2(q−1)
1
α
(1−p)p
(2−p)2(q−1)
1
α
p2
(q−1)2(2−p)2
1
α
...
p2
(q−1)2(2−p)2
1
α

+O
(1
q
)
=

1−p
4−3p
1−p
4−3p
1−p
4−3p
1−p
4−3p
0
...
0

+O
(1
q
)
with
α = 4 (1− p)p(2− p)2(q − 1) + (q − 4)
p2
(q − 1)2(2− p)2 =
p(4− 3p)
(2− p)2(q − 1) +O
(1
q
)
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• Case 9 Identical result to the above.
Once we know all the columns of matrix Π2 ×Π2, the result follows easily.
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